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Given  the  broad  consensus  that  private 
sector  investment  is  the  engine  of  eco- 
nomic  growth,  it  comes  as  no  surprise 
that  a  number  of  public  policies  aim  at 
stimulating  private  investment,  especially 
when  the  economy  is  slumping.  Some 
programs  attempt  direct  manipulation  of 
the  level  of  aggregate  (public  plus  pri- 
vate)  investment  via  increases  in  spend- 
ing.  Others  attempt  to  spur  private 
investment  indirectly  by  reducing  the 
cost  of  capital.  Such  programs  include  tax 
incentives  (such  as  the  investment  tax 
credit  or  a  reduction  of  corporate  income 
or  capital  gains  tax  rates)  and  policies 
aimed  at  lowering  interest  rates. 
Once  accepted  as  effective  policy  tools, 
these  programs  have  recently  come  under 
increasing  scrutiny.  No  longer  can  any 
program  be  justified  on  theoretical 
grounds  alone:  Empirical  evidence  is 
increasingly  used  to  justify  public  spend- 
ing  and  tax  programs,  particularly  in  the 
current  climate  of  fiscal  prudence  and 
scarce  economic  resources. 
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In  this  issue  of  our  P&c  P&y  Brig  series,  Thomas  Karier  analyzes 
one  Iong-accepted  program,  the  investment  tax  credit.  Introduced  in 
1962  and  employed  sporadically  until  its  elimination  in  1986,  the 
ITC  is  once  again  being  promoted  as  a  possible  means  by  which  the 
public  sector  might  induce  private  sector  investment.  Karier’s  exten- 
sive  analysis  takes  into  account  all  possible  economic  effects  (via 
price  changes,  income  effects,  and  multiplier  effects)  that  an  ITC 
might  have  on  a  firm’s  investment  decisions.  He  finds  that  the  ITC 
had  little  effect  on  investment  spending,  but  rather,  tended  to  result 
in  a  firm’s distributing  its  savings  in  the  form  of  dividends  or  decrease 
ing  its  issuance  of  debt  or  equity  instruments. 
In  light  of  the  problems  found  with  investment  tax  credits,  Karier 
presents  arguments  for  why  the  government  should  instead  undertake 
public  investment  in  the  form  of  spending  on  physical  infrastructure, 
education,  technology,  and  research.  Such  projects  might  be  funded 
through  cuts  in  other  spending  areas  or  an  increase  in  corporate 
profit  taxes,  which  have  funded  a  decreasing  share  of  public  spend- 
ing,  especially  over  the  past  decade. 
In  the  aftermath  of  recent  gains  in  private  equipment  spending  and 
seemingly  satisfactory  economic  recovery,  skeptics  may  question  the 
merits  of  even  a  small  public  investment  program.  Even  though 
fiiancing  public  investment  must  not  occur  at  the  expense  of  federal 
budget  deficit  reduction  and  long-term  control  of  the  national  debt, 
we  firmly  believe  that  a  modest  program  of  public  investment  and  fis- 
cal  responsibility  arc  not  mutually  exclusive  strategies.  By  publishing 
this  research,  we  hope  to  stimulate  a  reconsideration  of  past  policy  so 
that  a  new  policy  approach  to  public  investment  might  be  developed. 
Dimitri  B.  Papadimitriou 
Executive Director 
June  1994 
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Reconsidered 
I.  Introduction 
If  the  United  States  is  to  achieve  a  high 
level  of  economic  prosperity  for  all  its  tit- 
izens,  it  must  maintain  an  adequate  level 
of  investment.  Unfortunately,  private  sec- 
tor  investment  has  often  fallen  short  of 
this  level.  For  many  years  the  federal  gov- 
ernment  attempted  to  remedy  this  defi- 
ciency  by  providing  businesses  with  a 
variety  of  specifically  targeted  tax  incen- 
tives.  In  1962  businesses  were  offered  a 
tax  credit  based  on  a  percentage  of 
investment  in  equipment.  Since  then 
additional  incentives  to  invest  have  been 
introduced  by  lowering  the  tax  rate  on 
corporate  income.  And,  when  the  tax 
credit  was  finally  repealed  in  1986,  it  was 
replaced  by  a  further  reduction  in  corpo- 
rate  tax  rates. 
As  this  report  documents,  it  is  not  at  all 
clear  that  these  tax  incentives  had  any 
effect  on  investment  spending.  Businesses 
did  not  demonstrate  any  tendency  to 
raise  investment  in  response  either  to  the 
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appears  that  much  of  the  benefit  derived  from  these  tax  incentives 
went  to  increase  dividends  paid  to  shareholders  and  to  replace  funds 
that  otherwise  would  have  been  obtained  from  the  sale  of  stocks  or 
bonds. 
It  would  be  easier  to  ignore  the  failure  of  corporate  tax  incentives  if 
they  did  not  carry  such  a  high  price.  In  1981  aIone  corporations 
claimed  $19  billion  for  ITCs,  more  than  the  entire  amount  spent  by 
the  U.S.  Department  of  Energy  that  year.  Lower  corporate  tax  rates 
today  cost  taxpayers  far  more  than  that  amount. 
Because  adequate  investment  spending  is  essential,  especially  during 
recessions,  alternatives  to  tax  incentives  must  be  pursued.  A  logical 
alternative  is  a  bnyad  program  of  public  investment  in  education, 
infrastructure,  and  technology.  While  education  and  technology 
require  steady  outlays,  expenditures  on  transit  systems,  bridges,  and 
other  infrastructure  could  easily  be  temporarily  expanded  during 
recessionary  periods. 
There  is  an  important  question  about  how  such  a  program  of  public 
investment  would  be  financed.  More  than  a  modest  expansion  of 
public  investment  could  be  funded  by  simply  rearranging  spending 
priorities  in  the  current  budget.  In  particular,  significant  funds  could 
be  transferred  from  those  government  entities  whose  missions  once 
depended  on  the  now  defunct  Cold  War.  Additional  funds  could  be 
secured  through  borrowing  especially  during  recessions  when  federal 
deficits  provide  a  useful  stimulus. 
Another  source  of  funds  for  public  investment  is  the  corporate 
income  tax.  This  tax  paid  for  29  percent  of  government  outlays  in 
1950,  but  only  7  percent  in  1992.  If  these  tax  breaks  had  stimulated 
investment,  employment,  and  economic  growth  as  expected,  there 
would  be  far  less  need  for  public  investment  today.  But  the  need  per- 
sists, and  the  corporate  income  tax  could  make  it  possible. 
The  economic  analysis  described  in  this  report  demonstrates  that  two 
important  tax  incentives  -the  ITC  and  corporate  tax  rates-had 
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little  effect  on  investment  spending.  One  has  to  wonder  why  corpo- 
rate  tax  rates  should  remain  so  low  if  they  do  not  produce  higher 
investment  and  economic  growth. 
I  I.  Historical  Background 
According  to  the  Revenue  Act  of  1962,  the  stated  purpose  of  the 
ITC  is  “to  encourage  modernization  and  expansion  of  the  Nation’s 
productive  facilities  and  thereby  improve  the  economic  potential  of 
the  country,  with  a  resultant  increase  in  job  opportunities  and  better- 
ment  of  our  competitive  position  in  the  world  economy.” 
There  are  few  macroeconomic  disorders  for  which  a  large  injection  of 
investment  is  not  considered  a  suitable  remedy.  Keynesians  well 
understand  that  a  surge  of  investment  can  bolster  aggregate  demand 
and  revive  a  stagnating  economy.  Supply-side  economists  hold  the 
additional  view  that  inflation  is  best  prevented  by  the  production  of 
abundant  goods  and  services,  for  which  investment  is  an  obvious  pred 
requisite.  Investment  also  is  essential  to  ensure  long-run  growth  and 
higher  productivity.  Finally,  it  is  widely  argued  that  high  levels  of 
investment  are  necessary  to  ensure  the  comperitiveness  of  U.S.  cor- 
porations  as  they  engage  foreign  rivals  in  the  contest  for  world  mar- 
ket  shares.  It  would  be  difficult  to  exaggerate  the  range  of  benefits 
commonly  attributed  to  investment  spending. 
Given  the  goal  of  expanding  investment,  how  does  one  ensure  suffi- 
cient  quantity?  Only  government  investment,  including  education, 
infrastructure,  and  research,  is  amenable  to  direct  and  immediate 
manipulation.  Most  investment  in  the  private  sector  is  determined 
by  the  disparate  actions  of  hundreds  of  large  firms  and,  to  a  lesser 
degree,  hundreds  of  thousands  of  smaller  ones.  Efforts  to  promote 
investment  in  the  private  sector  have,  by  necessity,  resorted  to  indi- 
rect  measures  such  as  tax  incentives. 
The  purpose  of  this  research  is  to  determine  the  effectiveness  of  one 
of  these  efforts,  the  investment  tax  credit.  The  implementation  of 
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this  credit,  in  effect  at  various  times  between  1962  and  1986,  consti- 
tutes  an  important  experiment  in  economic  policy.  During  this 
period  firms  were  permitted  a  credit  against  their  income  tax  liability 
equivalent  to  a  percentage  of  their  investment  in  machinery,  equip- 
ment,  or  furniture.  Excluded  from  the  tax  credit  were  buildings, 
structural  components,  and  intangible  property. 
The  most  difficult  policy  to  assess  is  one  that  never  changes  over 
time;  fortunately,  this  is  not  the  case  for  the  ITC.  After  being  intro- 
duced  in  1962,  the  credit  was  suspended  from  October  1966  to 
March  1967,  terminated  from  April  1969  to  August  1971,  and  finally 
eliminated  in  1986.  What  began  as  a  7  percent  credit  in  1962  was 
increased  to  10  percent  in  1975.  In  addition,  the  original  law  in  1962 
required  a  reduction  in  the  depreciable  or  basis  value  of  the  invest- 
ment  equivalent  to  the  size  of  the  credit.  This  requirement  was 
dropped  in  1964  but  partially  reinstated  in  1982  with  a  required 
reduction  in  basis  value  equivalent  to  half  the  credit.  Additional 
restrictions  were  applied  to  certain  industries  as  well  as  to  short-lived 
assets  and  investments  outside  the  United  States.  All  of  these 
changes  and  qualifications  may  have  created  headaches  for  tax 
accountants,  but  they  enrich  the  quality  of  the  experiment  by 
increasing  the  variation  in  the  credits  over  time. 
The  ITC  is  believed  to  stimulate  investment  in  three  primary  ways. 
The  first  is  through  a  price  effect,  that  is,  a  response  to  a  change  in 
the  cost  of  capital.  By  effectively  reducing  the  price  of  additional  cap- 
ital  and  raising  the  rate  of  return,  the  tax  credit  is  expected  to  stimu- 
late  additional  investment.  However,  the  actual  response  may  be 
insignificant  if  either  the  change  in  the  cost  of  capital  is  small  or 
demand  is  relatively  unresponsive  to  price  changes. 
III.  How  the  Credits  Work 
Statistical  studies  conducted  in  the  late  1960s  often  found  a  strong 
price  effect  for  credits,  largely  due  to  the  growth  of  investments  foL 
lowing  the  introduction  of  the  ITC  in  1962.  But  this  evidence  is  at 
12  Fmic  P&y  Brief Business  Tax  incentives  and  lnwmnents 
least  partially  suspect,  since  the  credit  was  introduced  in  the  wake  of 
the  196&61  recession,  a  time  when  investments  were  far  more  likely 
to  rise  than  fall. 
A  second  possible  way  in  which  a  tax  credit  can  affect  investment  is 
through  cash  flow.  A  firm  qualihing  for  the  tax  credit  reduces  its  tax 
liability,  thus  raising  its  after-tax  profit.  This  income  is  then  available 
for  capital  investment.  But  the  available  income  might  also  be  used 
for  other  purposes,  such  as  paying  higher  dividends,  making  financial 
investments,  buying  back  outstanding  stock  or  bonds,  or  financing 
acquisitions.  There  is  always  a  question  about  how  much  of  any  addi- 
tional  corporate  income  is  spent  on  capital  investment. 
A  third  way  in  which  tax  credits  might  affect  capital  expenditures  is 
based  on  the  general  Keynesian  multiplier  effect.  Any  expansion  of 
the  government  deficit  may  create  a  short-run  stimulus  sufficient  to 
boost  aggregate  demand  and  spark  higher  levels  of  investment  spend- 
ing.  The  effectiveness  of  such  a  deficit  depends  primarily  on  the  state 
of  the  economy,  such  as  the  level  of  unemployment.  It  also  depends 
on  whether  the  credits  are  absorbed  by  the  corporation,  distributed  to 
stockholders,  or  passed  through  to  consumers  in  the  form  of  lower 
prices.  Some  of  these  conditions  are  discussed  in  more  detail  later, 
but  in  general  it  is  presumed  that  the  multiplier  effect  of  an  ITC 
resembles  that  of  any  other  corporate  tax  cut.  The  issue,  therefore,  is 
whether  the  ITC  provides  an  incentive  to  invest  above  and  beyond 
the  fiscal  stimulus  induced  by  a  reduction  in  corporate  taxes. 
Two  related  measures  of  equipment  investment  spending  could  be 
affected  by  tax  credits.  A  tax  credit  could  increase  the  share  of  the 
nation’s  output  dedicated  to  producers’  equipment  or  it  could  raise 
the  annual  rate  of  growth  of  investment  spending.  Effects  on  both 
equipment  shares  and  equipment  growth  are  considered  in  this  study. 
There  also  is  a  question  of  whether  equipment  and  gross  domestic 
product  (GDP)  should  be  adjusted  separately  for  relative  prices  when 
calculating  investment  shares.  This  matters  only  because  equipment 
prices  have  diverged  from  GDP  prices  over  the  course  of  the  past  45 
years.  In  theory,  the  tests  could  be  conducted  using  either  nominal 
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values  or  real  values  as  long  as  relative  prices  are  included  in  the 
model.’ 
A.  Equipment  Shares 
The  historical  pattern  between  equipment  investment  and  the  ITC  is 
presented  in  Figure  1.  Equipment  investment  is  measured  as  a  share 
of  GDP,  and  both  are  adjusted  using  appropriate  price  indexes.  The 
investment  tax  credit  is  essentially  a  rate:  the  value  of  credits  claimed 
by  co 
tI) 
orations  divided  by  expenditures  on  producer’s  durable  equip- 
merit.  The  pattern  for  the  ITC  in  the  figure  captures  several  impor- 
tant  events:  the  suspension  from  1969  to  1971,  the  increase  from  7 
percent  to  10  percent  in  1975,  and  the  final  repeal  in  1986.  The  fig- 
ure  also  shows  that  real  equipment  spending  climbed  erratically,  from 
Figure  1 
Equipment  Shares  of  GDP  and  Investment  Tax  Credits 
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Equip/GDP  is  equal  to  producer’s  durable  equipment  divided  by  GDP,  both 
adjusted  for  inflation.  ITC  is  equal  to  total  corporate  investment  tax  credits 
divided  by  equipment  investment. 
Sowce:  NIPA  and  Corporation  Income  Tax  Returns,  IRS. 
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4.4  percent  in  1961  to  7.6  percent  in  1992.  While  the  beginning  of 
this  ascent  corresponds  with  the  passage  of  the  ITC  in  1962,  the 
trend  continued  even  after  the  credit  was  repealed  in  1986.’ 
In  order  to  assess  the  effect  of  the  ITC  on  equipment  spending,  the 
influence  of  other  factors  must  be  separated  from  that  of  the  ITC.  A 
particularly  important  element  is  equipment  prices.4  As  seen  in 
Figure  2,  the  upward  trend  in  real  equipment  investment  between 
1962  and  1992  coincides  with  a  downward  trend  in  equipment 
prices.  This  is  one  of  the  competing  variables  that  can  be  used  to 
explain  changes  in  equipment  investments. 
Figure  2 
Equipment  Shares  of  GDP  and  Prices 
Equip/GDP  Equip  Price 
0.02 
0 









Equip/GDP  is  defined  in  Figure  1.  Fquip  price  is  equal  to  the  price  deflator  for 
producer’s  dwahle  equipment  divided  by  the  price  deflator  for  GDP. 
Source:  NIPA. 
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Equipment  prices  and  the  ITC-along  with  real  interest  rates  and 
marginal  tax  rates  -fall  into  the  category  of  cost-of-capital  variables 
that  potentially  affect  investment.  Capital  is  cheaper  when  tax  rates, 
interest  rates,  or  equipment  prices  are  lower.  Another  variable  that 
could  influence  equipment  investment  is  corporate  cash  flow,  which 
captures  the  income  effect.  Finally,  investment  could  be  considered 
to  be  a  function  of  capacity  utilization,  as  firms  are  more  likely  to 
invest  after  excess  capacity  has  been  exhausted. 
For  the  most  part  these  variables  and  this  analysis  (fully  described  in 
Appendix  A)  follow  conventional  lines.  There  is,  however,  one 
innovation  that  warrants  an  explanation.  Most  studies  of  investment 
behavior  rely  on  a  single  measure  of  capital  costs.  This  has  the  unfor- 
tunate  characteristic  of  combining  current  variables  that  should  have 
a  direct  effect  on  investment  (such  as  equipment  prices)  with  current 
variables  that  serve  as  proxies  for  future  variables  (such  as  marginal 
tax  rates  and  real  interest  rates).  Instead,  the  effects  of  several  of  the 
most  prominent  components  of  the  cost  of  capital  are  measured  here 
separateIy.  This  approach  places  the  fewest  restrictions  on  how  firms 
actually  process  current  information  in  developing  future 
expectations. 
The  results  of  this  statistical  analysis  demonstrate  that  investment 
levels  are  significantly  higher  when  capacity  utilization  is  high  or 
equipment  prices  are  low.  In  addition,  tax  credits,  whether  included 
separately  or  in  the  full  model,  do  not  appear  to  have  a  significant 
effect  on  the  level  of  equipment  investment;  the  coefficient  on 
investment  tax  credits  was  not  significantly  different  from  zero  in 
either  case.  Finally,  the  coef3cients  on  marginal  tax  rates,  cash  flow, 
and  real  interest  rates  were  neither  sign&cant  nor  always  the 
expected  sign.  Hence,  there  is  no  compelling  evidence  here  of  a 
strong  effect  of  investment  tax  credits  on  the  level  of  investment 
spending.  (Other  results  are  discussed  in  more  detail  in  Appendix  A.) 
The  absence  of  a  strong,  positive  effect  of  tax  credits  on  equipment 
investment  is  an  important  result.  However,  it  is  equally  important  to 
consider  the  specific  channels  through  which  the  credit  is  expected 
to  work.  To  this  end,  we  must  investigate  the  price  and  income 
effects. 
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B.  The  Price  Ejfect 
In  an  early  article  investigating  price  effects  and  investment  behav- 
ior,  Hall  and  Jorgenson  (1967)  concluded  that  “the  investment  tax 
credit  has  been  a  potent  stimulus  to  the  level  of  investment;  it  also 
shifted  the  composition  of  investment  toward  equipment.”  This 
highlights  an  important  point:  If  the  tax  credit  has  a  distinct  price 
effect,  the  composition  of  investment  should  shift  in  favor  of  equip- 
ment.  Figure  3  shows  producer’s  durable  equipment  as  a  share  of  non+ 
residential  investment,  each  separately  corrected  for  inflation  (the 
ITC  from  Figure  1  has  also  been  superimposed  on  this  figure).  The 
ratio  rose  from  49  percent  in  1961  to  73  percent  in  1992.  It  is  evident 
in  the  figure  that  the  composition  of  investment  shifted  toward 
equipment  when  the  investment  tax  credit  was  in  effect,  but  ic sltifted 
even  more  toward  equipment  afte-r  the  credit  was  repealed  in  1986. 
Figure  3 
Equipment  Share  of  Nonresidential  Investment, 
Relative  Prices,  and  the  ITC 
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ITC  is  defiied  in  Fiire  1.  Equip/Invest  is  equal  to  producer’s  durable  equip- 
ment  divided  by  nonresidential  fixed  investment.  Equip price  is  equal  to  the 
mtio  of price  deflators  for equipment  and  nonnzsidential  fixed  investment. 
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Figure  3  also  displays  a  second  possible  explanation  for  the  changing 
composition  of  investment,  namely,  that  equipment  prices  relative  to 
nonresidential  investment  fell  gradually  from  the  early  1960s  to  the 
present.  A  separate  statistical  analysis  shows  that  relative  prices  are 
statistically  significant  in  a  model  that  explains  93  percent  of  the 
variation  in  equipment  composition.  The  investment  tax  credit, 
however,  had  the  wrong  sign  and  was  insignificant.5  It  therefore  does 
not  appear  that  the  presence  of  the  investment  tax  credit  steers  firms 
toward  equipment  investment  as  one  would  expect  under  the  price 
effect. 
Is  there  a  possibility  that  equipment  and  structures  are  complement5 
rather  than  substitutes,  allowing  tax  credits  to  stimulate  both  forms 
of  investment?  This  seems  unlikely  because  equipment  investment 
succeeded  in  rising  relative  to  structures  in  the  late  198Os,  without 
the  benefit  of  the  investment  tax  credit.  It  is  also  worth  remembering 
that  even  if  a  fixed  proportion  of  structures  to  equipment  character- 
ized  every  single  business  in  the  United  States,  it  would  not  necessar- 
ily  apply  to  the  country  as  a  whoIe,  because  some  businesses  are  rela- 
tively  more  equipment-intensive  and  others  are  structure-intensive. 
Hence,  if  the  tax  credit  shifted  investment  toward  equipment-inten- 
sive  businesses,  the  relative  share  of  equipment  investment  for  the 
United  States  would  have  risen. 
While  the  absence  of  a  verifiable  price  effect  is  insufficient  to  dis- 
credit  the  ITC,  it  certainly  limits  its  potential  effectiveness.  Only  a 
strong  price  effect  permits  a  small  tax  credit  to  produce  a  large 
increase  in  investment.  We  now  turn  to  the  other  possible  mecha- 
nism,  the  income  effect. 
C.  Income  Effect 
According  to  the  income  effect,  if  a  firm  is  given  a  tax  refund,  it  is 
likely  to  spend  some  part  of  it  on  additional  investment.  The  fact 
that  the  refund  is  given  to  firms  that  make  relatively  high  invest- 
ments  should  further  increase  this  likelihood.  However,  even  in  the 
best  of  circumstances  some  portion  of  the  credit  is  likely  to  be 
diverted  to  other  purposes.  The  goal  of  the  tax  credit  could  be 
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entirely  frustrated  if  the  additional  cash  flow  is  simply  used  to  pay 
higher  dividends,  buy  back  outstanding  stock  or  debt,  or  replace 
more  conventional  sources  of  investment  funds.  Each  of  these  possi- 
bilities  is  considered  in  turn. 
Tax  credit-s  could  be  distributed  to  consumers  in  the  form  of  lower 
prices  or  to  employees  in  the  form  of  higher  salaries.  it  is  curious  that 
some  analysts  dismiss  this  response  as  unrealistic,  but  readily  accept 
the  companion  view  that  tax  incremes  are  passed  on  in  the  same  way 
to  consumers  or  employees.  If  it  is  possible  that  the  burden  of  the 
corporate  profit  tax  increase  can  be  shifted  to  consumers  or  employ- 
ees,  then  it  is  at  least  conceivable  that  tax  credits  provide  relief  to 
the  same  parties.  The  point  of  this  reasoning  is  that  whatever  portion 
of  a  tax  credit  is  shifted  in  this  manner  will  not  be  available  for  addi- 
tional  investment;  a  dollar  of  tax  credit  will  raise  after-tax  corpora[e 
profits  by  something  less  than  a  dollar. 
There  are  many  reasons  to  suspect  that  corporations  pay  for  most  of 
the  corporate  income  tax  (that  is,  that  they  do  not  pass  it  along  to 
consumers),  not  the  least  of  which  is  their  staunch  opposition  to  it. 
In  my  own  work  I  have  observed  that  the  size  of  the  price  increase 
necessary  to  pass  on  the  corporate  profit  tax  varies  widely  among  dif- 
ferent  companies  in  the  same  industry  and  for  the  same  company 
over  time  (Karier  1990).  This  fact  alone  makes  it  very  difficult  to 
pass  on  the  corporate  income  tax  without  benefiting  some  firms  at 
the  expense  of  others. 
No  amount  of  hypothesizing,  of  course,  will  settle  this  issue.  The  real 
test  is  whether  a  reduction  in  average  tax  rates  is  associated  with  con- 
stant  before-tax  profits  (no  shifting)  or  falling  profits  (shifting).  The 
relationship  between  corporate  profit  shares  before  taxes  and  average 
tax  rates  is  presented  in  Figure  4,  which  shows  that  profit  shares  have 
mirrored  the  business  cycle.6  They  also  experienced  a  oneetime  drop 
around  1970.  After  averaging  approximately  11  percent  between 
1946  to  1970,  the  profit  share  slid  to  about  9  percent  between  1970 
to  1992.  Average  tax  rates  also  declined  during  the  period,  falling 
from  over  50  percent  in  1951  to  less  than  30  percent  in  1992.  Did 
corporations  distribute  the  tax  savings  to  consumers  and  employees, 
thus  reducing  their  before-tax  profits? 
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Figure  4 
Average  Tax  Rates  and  Corporate  Profit  Shares  (Before  Taxes) 
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F’rofit  is  defined  as  corporate  profits,  including  inventory  valuation  adjust- 
ments,  capital  consumption  adjustment,  and  corporate  net  interest.  Tax 
rate  is  equal  to  corporate  profit  tax  liahiliw  divided  hy  profit. 
Source:  NIPA. 
There  are  two  reasons  to  believe  this  was  not  the  case.  First,  the  pat- 
tern  of  decline  in  profit  shares  does  not  match  the  pattern  of  decline 
in  tax  rates.  Whereas  profit  shares  appear  to  shift  to  a  new,  lower 
average  around  1970,  the  decline  in  tax  rates  is  concentrated  in  three 
distinct  periods:  1951  to  1954,  1960  to  1965,  and  1980  to  1983. 
A  second  objection  is  that  other  fiactors  can  easily  account  for  most 
of  the  variation  in  profit  shares.  Changes  in  capacity  utilization 
directly  affect  profit  shares  and  explain  much  of  their  movement  over 
the  business  cycle,  Profit  shares  are  also  affected  by  the  level  of  price 
competition  in  the  United  States,  which  can  be  stimulated  by  the 
growth  of  imports.  A  statistical  test  shows  that  these  two  variables- 
capacity  utilization  and  import  shares  of  gross  domestic  product-can 
account  for  approximately  81  percent  of  the  variation  in  profit  shares 
over  this  period.  The  predicted  values  of  this  simple  model  are  corn- 
pared  to  the  actual  values  in  Figure  5.  The  details  of  this  statistical 
test  arc  presented  in  Appendix  B. 
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Figure  5 
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The  test  results  show  that  there  is  little  variation  for  tax  rates  to 
explain  once  these  other  variables  are  considered.  It  should  be 
emphasized  that  once  capacity  utilization  and  imports  are  included  in 
the  model,  the  effect  of  tax  rates  on  profits  is  not  in  the  direction  one 
would  expect  if  shifting  had  taken  place  nor  is  it  statistically  signifi- 
cant. 
All  of  this  evidence  points  to  the  conclusion  that  reductions  in  the 
corporate  tax  rate,  including  ITCs,  are  not,  for  the  most  part,  passed 
on  to  consumers  and  employees.  Instead,  firms  are  left  with  relatively 
higher  after-tax  income  that  is,  at  the  very  least,  available  to  finance 
additional  investment.  This  brings  us  to  the  next  potential  leakage, 
dividends. 
The  fraction  of  profits  after  taxes  actually  distributed  as  dividends 
from  1946  to  1992  is  reported  in  Figure  6.  In  the  1980s  and  1990s 
approximately  60  percent  of  after-tax  income  was  paid  out  as  divi- 
dends  compared  to  approximately  45  percent  during  the  19SOs, 
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196Os,  and  1970s.  In  addition  to  this  general  increase,  dividend 
shares  tended  to  move  countercyclically,  rising  in  recessions  and 
falling  in  expansions.  A  simple  statistical  analysis  covering  the  years 
1946  to  1992  shows  that  for  every  $1  increase  in  after-tax  profits,  div- 
idends  rose  56  cents.7  This  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  56  percent 
of  the  savings  from  an  UC  will  be  distributed  as  dividends;  the  actual 
amount  could  be  more  or  less,  but  this  figure  is a  useful  benchmark. 
There  also  is  no  assurance  that  the  remainder,  retained  earnings,  will 
be  devoted  exclusively  to  additional  real  investment.  The  funds 
made  available  from  tax  credits  could  be  used  by  a  company  to  buy 
the  stocks  and  bonds  of  other  companies,  to  purchase  its  own  stocks 
or  bonds,  or  to  finance  a  merger  or  take-over.  It  is  equally  possible 
that  these  funds  would  simply  supplant  other  sources  of  investment 
funds,  such  as  the  sale  of  debt  or  equity.  Each  of  these  diversions 
tends  to  dilute  the  amount  of  the  tax  credit  ultimately  spent  on  new 
investment. 
1 
Figure  6 
Dividends  as  a  Share  of  After-Tax  f%ofits 
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Snwce:  NIPA. 
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How  much  of  after-tax  profits  are  spent  on  real  property,  plant,  and 
equipment  and  how  much  are  diverted  to  other  uses?  Another  way  to 
investigate  this  question  is  to  look  at  the  behavior  of  a  large  number 
of  firms.  For  this  purpose,  a  sample  was  drawn  of  1,837  companies 
from  the  Compustat  Database  for  1991  (the  most  recent  year  avail- 
able).’  In  that  data  set  income  was  measured  after  taxes  but  before 
extraordinary  items,  and  investment  was  equal  to  capital  expenditure 
on  property,  plant,  and  equipment.  (Appendix  C  describes  the  model, 
which  includes  several  additional  variables  representing  sources  of 
investment  funds,  and  the  test  used).  The  results  show  that  a  firm 
with  an  additional  $1  of  after-tax  income  spends  only  $0.12  more  on 
property,  plant,  and  equipment.  The  same  firm,  however,  spends 
approximately  $0.40  more  on  dividends,  reduces  its  sale  of  stock  (less 
repurchases)  by  as  much  as  $0.21,  and  decreases  its  net  sale  of  debt  by 
$0.17.  We  can  therefore  conclude  that  firms  with  relatively  higher 
after-tax  income  distribute  more  dividends  and  reduce  the  relative 
value  of  their  sales  of  stocks  and  bonds.  The  amount  that  trickles 
down  into  additional  investment  is  not  large. 
IV.  Investment  and  Economic  Growth 
A.  Tire  ITC  arul  E+@ment  Investment 
The  popular  image  of  equipment  investment  was  reinforced  in  a 
recent  article  by  J.  Bradford  DeLong  and  Lawrence  Summers  (1991) 
in  which  the  authors  claimed  that  countries  with  a  relatively  high 
level  of  equipment  investment  also  experienced  relatively  high 
growth  rates.  The  surprising  result  was  that  this  relationship  held 
only  for  equipment  investment  and  not  for  related  investments  in 
structures. 
The  beneficial  effect  of  high  levels  of  equipment  investment  spend- 
ing,  unfortunately,  is  not  as  readily  apparent  for  the  United  States  for 
the  years  1950  to  1992.  Figure  7  shows  the  ratio  of  spending  on 
durable  equipment  to  GDP  and  the  growth  rates  of  real  GDP,  calcu- 
lated  as  five-year  moving  averages.  There  is  little  evidence  in  this  fig- 
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me  that  high  levels  of  private  investment  in  equipment  are  associ- 
ated  with  strong  economic  growth. 
Figure  7 
ReaI  GDP  Growth  and  Equipment  Shares  of  GDP 
Percentage  Change  and  Share  of  GDP 
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GDP  growth  is  calculated  as  a  five-ycm  moving  average. 
Source:  NIPA. 
One  possible  explanation  for  this  result  is  related  to  energy  efficiency. 
Rising  energy  prices  in  the  1970s  created  a  strong  demand  for  more 
energy-efficient  equipment  and  structures.  It  is  conceivable  that  in 
the  process  of  becoming  more  energy-efficient,  U.S.  capital  invest* 
ments  contributed  less  to  real  advances  in  output.  Figure  8  illustrates 
how  profound  the  change  in  energy  efficiency  actually  was.  It  shows 
the  relative  output  of  the  industrial  sector  per  unit  of  energy.9  By  this 
measure  energy  efficiency  climbed  56  percent  between  1972  and 
1991.  There  is,  however,  one  problem  with  this  explanation.  Energy 
prices  leveled  off  in  the  1980s  and  energy  efficiency  stabilized,  yet 
high  levels  of  equipment  investment  still  failed  to  boost  economic 
growth. Business TQX lncentives and  lnvesments 
Figure  8 
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Index  is  equal  to  industrial  producrion  index  divided  by  total  energy  con- 
sumed  hy  indusrry  in  Btu. 
Source:  Economic  Report  of  dte  President,  1993;  Annual  E~~QY  Review,  U.S. 
Department  of  Energy. 
Most  likely  other  factors  are  at  the  root  of  the  slowdown  in  economic 
growth,  but  Figure  7  serves  as  a  useful  reminder  that  boosting  the 
share  of  national  output  dedicated  to  equipment  investment  does  not 
guarantee  economic  growth.  This  fact  should  not  be  construed  to 
mean  that  investment  spending  is  not  important.  There  is  still  the 
familiar  fact,  presented  in  Figure  9,  that  annual  changes  in  real 
investment  spending  are  closely  related  to  annual  changes  in  real 
GDI?  It  may  be  difficult  to  sort  out  the  causality  in  this  relationship, 
but  at  least  some  part  of  it  can  be  attributed  to  the  f&t  that  rapid 
changes  in  investment  spending  can  alter  the  trajectory  of  economic 
growth.  In  this  lies  a  paramount  need  for  public  policy:  to  compen- 
sate  for  the  volatility  of  private  sector  investment. 
Does  the  historical  record  have  anything  to  say  about  the  effective- 
ness  of  an  ITC  as  a  countercyclical  tool?  In  its  first  few  years  of  exis- 
tence  the  ITC  actually  was  used  to  counter  the  business  cycle.  It  was 
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Figure  9 
Annual  Real  Growth  Rates  of  GDP  and  Equipment  Investment 
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GDP  and  producer’s durable equipment  investment  are both  core 
rected  for inflation  and  then  calculxed  as annual  growth  rates. 
Sourcz: NIPA. 
initially  deployed  when  investment  was  relatively  low  and  then 
revoked  twice  (in  1966  and  1969)  when  investment  showed  signs  of 
recovering.  lo  But  between  its  reinstatement  in  1971  and  repeal  in 
1986,  the  credit  was  offered  in  good  times  and  bad.  The  end  of  the 
credit  as  a  countercyclical  policy  after  1971  marked  a  victory  for  the 
business  sector,  which  had  from  the  start  insisted  on  a  permanent 
tax  cut. 
The  relationship  between  the  investment  tax  credit  and  real  growth 
in  equipment  investment  was  analyzed  in  more  detail  and  is 
described  in  Appendix  A.  In  general,  there  was  no  evidence  that  the 
existence  of  the  tax  credit  had  any  significant  effect  on  this  growth 
rate.  Only  conventional  business  cycle  variables-capacity  utilization 
and  real  GDP  growth-had  a  positive  and  significant  effect  on  the 
growth  of  equipment  investment.  I1  There  is  reason  to  suspect  from 
this  evidence  that  the  ITC  would  not  have  made  an  effective  coun- 
tercyclical  tool. Business Tax  incentives  and  hesmen~ 
A  revised  form  of  the  ITC  was  recently  proposed  by  President 
Clinton’s  advisers  and  tested  in  an  economic  model  by  Meyer, 
I’rakken,  and  Varvares  (1993).  The  basic  Clinton  plan  included  some 
aspects  of  the  ITC  as  it  existed  in  1985,  except  that  it  limited  credits 
to  investments  exceeding  some  fraction  (70  to  80  percent)  of  historic 
levels.  The  purpose  of  the  threshold  was  to  preserve  the  incentive  for 
additional  investment  without  rewarding  all  investments,  thus  saving 
the  government  some  tax  revenue. 
The  original  proposal  for  the  ITC  in  the  Kennedy  administration 
included  similar  marginal  criteria.  The  Treasury’s  initial  proposal  in 
1961  offered  a  credit  of  “1.5  percent  of  expenditures  for  new  and  tan- 
gible  plant  and  equipment  in  excess  of  100  percent  depreciation”  and 
“a  credit  equal  to  6  percent  of  capital  outlays  greater  than  50  percent 
of  depreciation  and  an  automatic  lo-percent  credit  on  the  first 
$5,000  of  new  investment.”  (King  1993,  p.  175).  It  was  this  gradu- 
ated  aspect  of  the  investment  credit  that  incited  much  of  the  busi- 
ness  opposition  to  the  original  proposal.  Businesses  were  much  less 
interested  in  the  incentive  aspect  of  the  credit  than  they  were  in  the 
income-enhancing  aspects,  which  were  sharply  curtailed  by  a  gradu- 
ated  tax.  Lobbyists  for  business  thought  they  could  do  better,  and 
they  did,  by  pressuring  the  Kennedy  administration  to  adopt  the  flat 
7  percent  rate  that  became  law  in  1962. 
Only  if  the  ITC  works  through  the  price  effect  does  a  marginal  or 
graduated  rate  make  any  sense.  This  is  because  it  preserves  the  price 
incentives  while  reducing  the  income  effect.  The  problem  with  this 
approach  is  not  theoretical  but  empirical.  As  we  have  seen  in  the 
past,  7  percent  and  10  percent  tax  credits  were  not  sufficient  incen- 
tives  to  spark  a  discernible  growth  in  equipment  investment  relative 
to  structures.  A  marginal  tax  credit  has  the  advantage  of  a  smaller 
effect  on  the  government  budget  but  its  reliance  on  price  effects  does 
not  promise  any  significant  growth  in  investment. 
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V.  Policy  Implications 
For  more  than  20  years,  the  federal  government  provided  corpora- 
tions  with  billions  of  dollars  of  tax  credits  in  the  hope  of  raising  the 
level  of  investment  in  equipment.  According  to  the  evidence  pre- 
sented  here,  these  credits  did  not  have  a  perceptible  effect  on  either 
the  growth  in  real  equipment  expenditures  or  the  proportion  of 
national  output  dedicated  to  equipment  investment. 
These  observations  were  reinforced  by  more  detailed  investigations 
into  how  tax  credits  are  supposed  to  work.  Although  the  KC  was 
supposed  to  increase  the  importance  of  equipment  in  total  nonresi- 
dential  investment,  the  evidence  that  it  did  is  lacking.  The  tax  credit 
did  not  appear  to  have  any  perceptible  impact  on  the  composition  of 
investment.  Furthermore,  while  some  of  the  credit  may  be  spent 
directly  on  additional  investment,  the  amount  may  be  minuscule. 
The  estimate  in  this  study  found  that  $0.12  or  less  of  every  additional 
$1  of  after-tax  income  was  spent  on  property  plant  and  equipmenq 
the  remainder  typically  was  used  to  pay  higher  dividends,  buy  stocks 
or  bonds,  or  release  firms  from  the  need  to  sell  as  much  debt  or 
equity. 
Much  of  the  evidence  presented  here  in  regard  to  the  ITC  is  directly 
relevant  to  the  effectiveness  of  other  corporate  tax  breaks.  Marginal 
tax  rates  on  corporate  income  have  declined  steadily  over  the  past  40 
years,  and  yet  the  evidence  does  not  show  any  perceptible  response 
in  higher  equipment  investment.  Generous  depreciation  rates  have 
.increased  corporate  cash  flow,  but  only  a  small  fraction  of  this  is 
likely  to  see  its  way  into  new  investment. 
While  ITCs  may  not  contribute  much  to  economic  growth,  there  is 
no  reason  to  abandon  the  effort  to  stimulate  investment,  both  for 
countering  the  business  cycle  and  for  creating  new  job  opportunities. 
The  failure  of  tax  incentives  to  stimulate  private  sector  investment 
only  means  that  future  efforts  may  be  more  successful  if  they  concen- 
trate  on  raising  public  sector  investment.  Private  and  public  invest- 
ment  share  at  least  one  thing  in  common:  They  are  both  evaluated 
according  to  whether  their  benefits  exceed  their  costs.  They  differ, 
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however,  since  the  public  sector  employs  a  broader  definition  for 
both  benefits  and  costs.  Unlike  a  private  firm,  the  government  is  not 
compelled  to  capture  its  benefits  in  the  form  of  higher  revenue 
(although  it  could).  The  government  also  has  to  consider  a  wider 
range  of  costs  than  a  private  firm.  A  new  public  investment  may  be 
profitable,  but  if  it  displaces  private  firms  in  the  process,  it  may  be 
ruled  out  by  the  broader  criteria  applied  to  public  investment. 
Public  investment  is  different  in  other  important  ways.  While  private 
investment  typically  contracts  during  recessions  and  shuns  particu- 
larly  impoverished  areas,  the  government  is  capable  of  exercising 
more  discretion.  Any  investment  made  during  a  recession  or  in  poor 
areas  is  likely  to  carry  a  higher  benefit  to  society. 
We  should  also  remember  that  the  choice  is  not  between  public 
investment  and  private  investment,  but  between  public  investment 
and  a  tax  credit.  There  is  the  important-if  not  obvious-fact  that  a 
dollar  spent  on  public  investment  will  produce  a  dollar  of  public  cap- 
ital.  A  dollar  spent  on  investment  tax  credits  cannot  claim  an  equiv- 
alent  impact  on  private  capital. 
In  many  ways  these  features  of  public  investment  make  it  ideally 
suited  to  achieve  the  goals  of  the  Revenue  Act  of  1962,  whtch  origi- 
nally  created  the  investment  tax  credit.  The  public  sector  is  in  a 
much  better  position  to  focus  on  projects  that  provide  an  “increase  in 
job  opportunities”  and  the  “betterment  of  our  competitive  position  in 
the  world  economy.”  Federal,  state,  and  local  governments  are 
already  directly  involved  in  extensive  pubtic  investment,  from 
sewage  systems  to  highways,  roads,  and  bridges.  Within  this  current 
system,  there  is  considerable  room  for  reform,  both  to  improve  its 
efficiency  and  to  meet  the  goals  that  the  investment  tax  credit  failed 
to  achieve. 
Recent  economic  analysis  has  begun  to  identify  particularly  fruitful 
areas  for  public  investment.  There  is  now  evidence  that  government 
expenditures  on  research  and  development  provid$  a  valuable  boost 
to  productivity  in  agriculture  and  manufacturing.  Even  with  these 
successes,  we  have  yet  to  see  the  full  potential  of  federal  R&D  on 
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productivity,  since  so  much  of  it  has  been  dedicated  to  the  refines 
ment  of  military  weapons.  As  recently  as  1990,  64  percent  of  federal 
R&D  expenditures  went  to  defense  (Aaron  and  Schultze  1992,  p. 
234).  The  reorientation  of  federal  R&D  toward  civilian  projects 
promises  an  even  greater  return  in  the  future. 
One  of  the  direct  benefits  from  an  investment  in  education  is  the 
increase  in  work  force  earnings.  Two  recent  studies  by  David  Card 
and  Alan  Krueger  demonstrate  that  the  returns  from  lowering  stu- 
dent-teacher  ratios,  extending  the  school  term,  and  raising  teacher 
pay  are  measurable  and  significant  (Card  and  Krueger  1992a,  1992b). 
This  is  another  area  where  an  increase  in  federal  investment  could 
make  a  big  difference,  especially  when  directed  at  cities  and  regions 
where  the  current  level  of  funding  is  clearly  inadequate. 
Finally,  there  is  the  possibility  of  expanding  the  amount  of  physical 
public  capital  defined  as  infrastructure.  While  this  capital-including 
roads,  sewers,  airports,  mass  transit,  and  water  systems-generates  its 
own  stream  of  future  benefits,  it  now  appears  to  be  positively  corre- 
lated  with  private  sector  employment  growth  and  productivity.  In  her 
investigation  of  this  topic,  Alicia  Munnell  found  “that  a  state’s 
investment  in  public  capital  had  a  significant  positive  impact  on  that 
state’s  private  employment  growth.”  She  also  concluded  that  “the 
evidence  clearly  indicated  that  public  capital  enhances  the  producw 
tivity  of  private  capital”  (Munnell  1990).  Similar  results  were  cited 
by  David  Aschauer  in  his  work  on  the  relationship  between  public 
capital  and  economic  growth  (Aschauer  1993).  While  these  results 
are  not  free  of  controversy,  the  message  is  clear:  The  benefit  from 
infrastructure  investment  is  probably  much  larger  than  the  immedie 
ate  value  of  improved  transportation  and  water  quality. 
Even  this  cursory  review  reveals  a  great  potential  for  expanding  pub- 
lic  investment  in  research,  education,  and  infrastructure.  However, 
any  serious  proposal  for  expanding  government  investment  also  has 
to  address  the  issue  of  funding.  Large  deficits  in  the  federal  budget 
have  made  any  new  expenditure  difficult,  even  one  that  generates 
future  benefits.  The  answer  is  to  fund  public  investment  through 
some  combination  of  user  fees,  spending  cuts,  and  tax  increases. 
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For  example,  much  of  the  investment  in  roads  and  highways  is 
already  funded  by  a  gasoline  tax.  Additional  funds  for  investment  in 
ground  transportation,  including  mass  transit  systems,  could  be  raised 
from  this  tax  or  from  user  fees.  There  are  few  reasons  not  to  charge 
tolls  on  highly  congested  thoroughfares  and  on  trucks  with  heavy 
loads.  It  is  no  secret  that  the  damage  done  to  the  nation’s  highways 
from  these  vehicles  easily  eclipses  that  of  the  far  more  numerous 
automobiles.  This  is  just  one  example  where  the  judicious  applica- 
non  of  user  fees  and  taxes  can  provide  adequate  funding  for  public 
infrastructure  investment. 
Funding  for  federal  research  is  easily  resolved  because  the  amount 
being  spent  is  not  necessarily  inadequate,  it  is  just  largely  misdi- 
rected.  A  sharp  reallocation  of  federal  funds  from  weapons  develops 
ment  toward  civilian  projects  promises  a  significant  return  without 
adding  a  cent  to  the  budget  deficit. 
Even  with  user  fees  and  spending  reallocations,  it  is  still  difficult  to 
imagine  attaining  adequate  levels  of  public  investment  without  some 
kind  of  tax  increase.  In  this  regard,  particular  attention  should  be 
directed  at  the  corporate  income  tax.  This  tax  has  fallen  to  historic 
lows  and,  if  revived,  could  provide  important  revenue  to  finance  a 
broad  program  of  public  investment. 
While  critics  will  decry  the  adverse  effect  of  a  corporate  tax  increase 
on  investment,  the  record  examined  in  this  report  suggests  otherwise. 
If  an  important  tax  break  like  the  ITC  failed  to  stimulate  investment, 
’  why  would  the  elimination  of  other  tax  breaks  depress  it?  After  all,  if 
corporate  tax  cuts  had  achieved  their  objectives-higher  investment, 
greater  job  opportunities,  and  higher  economic  growth-public 
investment  would  be  far  less  urgent  today. 
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Appendix  A 
Investment and  Tax Credit 
This  section  describes  the  statistical  tests  used  to  investigate  the  rela- 
tionship  between  ITCs  and  equipment  investment.  The  tests  utilized 
aggregate  annual  data  for  the  United  States  for  the  years  1946  to 
1992.  The  hypothesis  being  tested  is  whether  equipment  investment 
should  be  a  function  of  three  sets  of  variables:  cost  of  capital,  cash 
flow,  and  capacity  utilization. 
Conventional  estimates  of  capital  costs  typically  combine  several 
parameters  (such  as  capital  prices,  tax  rates,  real  interest  rates,  and 
tax  credits)  into  a  single  annual  value.  In  fact,  this  method  produces 
a  single  value  that  is  equivalent  to  an  annual  rent  payment  whose 
present  value  over  the  lifetime  of  the  equipment  (properly  dis- 
counted  for  time,  depreciation,  and  future  taxes)  is  equal  to  the  cur- 
rent  price  (Hall  and  Jorgenson  1967).  It  is  easy  to  forget  that  at  any 
moment  in  time,  a  firm  knows  for  certain  only  the  purchase  price  and 
tax  credit;  all  other  variables  (such  as  real  interest  and  tax  rates) 
apply  to  the  future  and,  therefore,  are  unknown.  Consequently,  the 
approach  used  here  is  to  include  each  variable  separately  under  the 
presumption  that  unknown  variables  may  have  less  influence  on 
investment  decisions. 
One  of  the  cost-of-capital  variables  is  the  real  interest  rate,  repre- 
sented  by  the  prime  rate  of  interest  less  the  rate  of  inflation  (as  mea. 
sured  by  the  GDP  deflator).  Another  cost-of-capital  variable  is  the 
corporate  tax  rate,  which  is  equal  to  the  statutory  tax  rate  on  corpo- 
rate  income.  Equipment  prices  are  represented  by  the  ratio  of  the 
price  deflator  for  producer’s  durable  equipment  to  the  GDP  deflator. 
In  addition,  the  ITC  is  included  as  the  ratio  of  total  corporate  invest- 
ment  tax  credits  to  producer’s  durable  equipment. 
Other  variables  included  in  the  model  were  capacity  utilization  for 
manufacturing  and  cash  flow,  equivalent  to  the  sum  of  the  consump- 
tion  of  fixed  capital  for  corporations  and  undistributed  corporate 
profits.  The  dependent  variable,  equipment  investment,  was  adjusted 
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for  inflation  and  then  divided  by  GDP,  similarly  adjusted.  All  of  the 
variables  were  obtained  from  the  National  Income  and  Product 
Accounts  (NIPA),  except  for  the  prime  interest  rate  and  capacity 
utilization,  which  were  obtained  from  The  Economic  Report  of  the 
President,  1993. 
Not  surprisingly,  the  model  using  ordinary  least  squares  demonstrated 
a  high  degree  of  first  order  serial  correlation.  Therefore,  the  results 
presented  in  Table  Al  are  based  on  a  correction  for  autocorrelation. 
In  column  1,  the  cash  flow  variable  alone  was  tested  and  found  to 
have  an  insignificant  effect  on  equipment  investment.  This  conclu- 
sion  did  not  change  in  the  fi~ll  model,  the  results  of  which  are  listed 
in  column  3.  The  effect  of  the  ITC  alone  is  tested  in  column  2  and 
the  Ml  model  in  column  3.  In  neither  case  is  the  ITC  found  to  have 
had  a  significant  effect  on  equipment  investment.  Equipment  invest- 
ment  did  respond  significantly  to  two  variables:  equipment  prices  and 
capacity  utilization.  Low  equipment  prices  and  high  capacity  utiliza- 
tion  both  appear  to  stimulate  equipment  investment. 
It  should  be  emphasized  that,  according  to  these  results,  equipment 
prices  have  had  a  negative  effect  on  real  equipment  investment. 
Recause  the  elasticity  implied  by  the  coefficient  on  equipment  prices 
is  nearly  one,  changes  in  equipment  prices  will  have  almost  no  effect 
on  the  nominal  amount  of  equipment  investment. 
13 
This  result  may  simply  be  a  characteristic  of  the  demand  for  equip- 
ment  goods,  but  there  are  two  other  possibiIities.  If  firms  make  deci- 
sions  about  how  much  to  spend  on  investment  independent  of 
investment  good  prices,  the  regression  results  would  not  be  any  dif- 
ferent;  firms  would  simply  allocate  a  certain  amount  of  funds  for 
investment  based  on  their  current  level  of  capacity  utilization.  If 
equipment  prices  are  unusually  low,  firms  would  spend  the  same 
nominal  amount  but  get  more  for  their  money.  In  this  case  equip- 
ment  prices  and  real  investment  would  also  be  negatively  related 
with  an  elasticity  approximately  equal  to  one. 
There  is  another  consideration.  Because  price  indexes  in  the  national 
accounts  are  adjusted  for  quality  improvement,  falling  equipment 
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Table  Al 
Estimated  Effects  of  Selected  Variables  on 
Real  Equipment  Investment  as  a  Share  of  GDP 
(195~1992  annual  observations) 
Independent 
Variable 
Estimated  Coefficients 
(standard  errors  in  parentheses) 
Cash  ITC  Full 
Flow  Only  Only  Model 
Cash  flow/GDP 
Real  interest  rate 
.028  -.019 
(.103)  (.082) 
.019 
t.024) 
Tax  rate 





Investment  tax  credit.  .Oll  .032 
(.062)  (.049) 
Capacity  utilization’  .049** 
.009 
Constant  .061**  .063**  .081 
(.012)  LOO91  (.022) 
Adjusted  R*  .a9  .89  .95 
Dwbin-Watson  1.55  1.54  1.55 
**  =  significantly  different  ftom  zeta  at  the  5  percent  level. 
=  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1 percent  level. 
‘Coefficient  and  standatd  error  multiplied  by  100. 
Source:  NIPA;  Economic  J7epm-t d  the  President,  1993. 
prices  could  simply  reflect  a  steady  improvement  in  quality.  At  least 
since  the  late  1970s  this  has  been  especially  true  for  computer  equip- 
ment.  When  firms  buy  more  equipment,  it  may  appear  that  they  are 
responding  to  lower  prices  when  in  fact  they  are  motivated  by  the 
higher  quality.  The  simple  correlation  between  equipment  prices  and 
investment  can  be  misleading  because  it  fails  to  tell  the  complete 
story.  It  is  unfortunate  that  further  exploration  of  these  issues  is 
beyond  the  scope  of  this  research. 
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An  additional  set  of  tests  was  ccx&ctecl  using  the  annual  growth  of 
real  equipment  investment  as  the  dependent  variable.  The  results  are 
reported  in  Table  A2.  The  ITC  continues  to  have  an  insignificant 
effect  when  tested  alone  or  in  the  full  model.  Cash  flow  has  a  signifi- 
cant,  positive  effect  on  equipment  growth  when  estimated  alone,  but 
Table  A2 
Estimated  Effects  of  Selected  Variables  on 
Growth  in  Real  Equipment  Expenditures 
(lSSl-1992  annual  observations) 
Independent 
Variable 
Cash  flow/GDP 
Estimated  Coefficients 
(srandard  errors  in  parentheses) 
Cash  Flow  ITC  FIllI 
Only  Only  Model 
3.80*  1.910 
(1.67)  (1.300) 
Real  interest  rate  .380 
C.299) 
Tax  rate  .284 
(.239) 
Equipment  prices 
_.~~ 
Investment  tax  credit 
-.317 
(.I@) 
5.43  .200 
(.439)  (.421) 
Capacity  utilizationa  .856** 
.195 
Growth-reaI/GDP  2.000** 
(.310) 
C0nstant  -.276  .022 
(.139)  (.017) 
Adjusted R2  .o!J  .Ol 
DurbiwWatson  2.01  1.98 
* 
** =  simificantly  different  from  zero at  rhe  5 percent  level, 
=  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  I  perccnl  level. 
aC&ficient  and  swxlard  error  multiplied  by  100. 
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not  in  the  full  model.  Only  capacity  utilization  and  the  growth  rate 
of  rea1 GDP  have  a  significant  effect  on  equipment  growth,  which  in 
both  cases  is  positive.  The  coefficients  on  these  two  variables  are 
likely  to  overstate  the  actual  effects,  as  the  variables  themselves  are 
likely  to  be  influenced  by  equipment  growth. 
In  this  study  cash  flow  is  not  found  to  make  a  significant  contribu- 
tion  to  equipment  investment.  Although  a  small  percentage  of  addi- 
tional  income  is  likely  to  be  spent  on  new  investment,  the  result  is 
not  large  enough  to  show  up  in  this  analysis.  There  are,  however, 
many  opportunities  to  overstate  this  relationship. 
It  should  be  remembered  that  cash  flow  consists  of  two  distinct  com- 
ponents:  capital  consumption  allowances  and  undistributed  profits. 
Capital  consumption  allowances  are  likely  to  be  correlated  with  cur- 
rent  investment  levels  due  to  the  simple  fact  that  both  are  correlated 
with  past  investment.  This  relationship  was  found  to  hold  when 
using  the  annual  aggregate  data  described  in  this  Appendix  and  the 
company  observations  described  in  Appendix  C.  Because  of  this, 
there  is  a  tendency  to  overstate  the  effect  of  cash  flow  on  investment. 
The  problem  was  largely  eliminated  in  this  model  by  correcting  for 
autocorrelation.  Once  the  correlation  between  current  investment 
levels  and  past  investment  levels  was  reduced,  the  correspondence 
between  cash  flow  (depreciation  in  particular)  and  current  invest- 
ment  diminished. 
The  other  component  of  cash  flow  is  undistributed  profits.  This  corn- 
ponent  is  less  likely  to  be  related  to  past  levels  of  investment  spend- 
ing  but  is  more  likely  to  be  correlated  with  other  business  cycle  vari- 
ables,  including  growth  of  real  investment  spending.  To  some  extent 
this  is  due  to  the  fact  that  an  increase  in  undistributed  profits  will 
increase  investments,  but  there  also  is  the  fact  that  both  profits  and 
investments  are  independently  related  to  the  business  cycle.  This 
may  be  the  reason  why  cash  flow  was  no  longer  significant  when 
business  cycle  variables  were  included  in  the  statistical  tests  (as 
shown  in  Table  A2,  column  3). 
36  Public Policy Brief Business  Tax  incentives  ati  1nwsm.m~ 
Appendix  6 
Tax  Incidence 
Tl-tis  section  explains  the  statistical  model  and  test  of  the  relation- 
ship  between  before-tax  profits  and  tax  rates.  To  the  extent  that  core 
porate  taxes  (and  tax  reductions)  are  passed  through  to  consumers 
and  employees,  average  tax  rates  should  be  positively  related  to 
before-tax  profits.  This  was  tested  using  a  profit  model  based  on  my 
previous  work  (Karier  1993). 
By  definition, 
(1)  n  =  pq  -  (ac)q  =  q(p  -  mc  +  mc  -  ac)  =  q(p  -  mc)  + 
q(mc  -  ac) 
where 
n  =  profits  before  taxes 
p  =  price 
q  =  output 
ac  =  average  cost 
mc  =  marginal  cost 
Dividing  both  sides  by  revenue  produces  the  result, 
(2)  z/R  =  (p  -  mc)/p  +  q(mc  -  ac)/R 
where 
R  =  revenue 
The  first  term  on  the  right  side  of  equation  (2)  is  defined  as  the 
markup  over  marginal  costs.  When  f%-ms  maximize  profits,  this  term 
is  equal  to  the  inverse  of  the  elasticity  of  demand,  defined  as 
monopoly  power.  The  second  term,  including  the  difference  between 
marginal  cost  and  average  cost,  is  related  to  capacity  utilization. 
Presuming  conventional  shortSrun  cost  curves,  marginal  cost  is  likely 
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to  exceed  average  cost  when  capacity  is  tight,  a  relationship  that  is 
reversed  when  capacity  is  underutilized. 
To  the  extent  that  higher  taxes  are  passed  through  to  consumers, 
firms  must  increase  their  markups,  resulting  in  higher  profits  before 
taxes.  Alternatively,  if  higher  taxes  are  passed  through  to  employees, 
who  are  forced  to  accept  lower  wages,  then  marginal  costs  decrease 
and  markups  still  rise.  Therefore,  tax  rates  should  be  positively 
related  to  profits  before  taxes  if  taxes  are  passed  through  either  to 
consumers  or  employees. 
Another  factor  that  is  likely  to  affect  monopoly  power  is  the  level  of 
foreign  competition  represented  by  imports.  The  greater  the  competi- 
tion  from  imports,  the  lower  the  level  of  monopoly  power  and 
markups. 
This  model  was  estimated  using  annual  data  for  the  years  1948  to 
1992.  Profit  shares  were  equal  to  corporate  profits  with  inventory  and 
capital  consumption  adjustments,  plus  net  interest  paid  by  the  corpo- 
rate  sector,  divided  by  GDP.  The  tax  rate  used  was  the  corporate 
profit  tax  liability  divided  by  the  same  profit  measure.  Imports  simply 
were  divided  by  GDP  and,  like  each  of  the  preceding  variables,  were 
obtained  from  the  NIPA.  Finally,  capacity  utilization  was  obtained 
for  manufacturing  from  the  ECOTIO~C  Report  of  the  Presidenr,  1993. 
Estimation  of  this  model  is  presented  in  Table  A3,  with  corrections 
for  first  order  serial  correlation. 
Golumn  1  of  the  table  shows  the  results  of  regressing  only  tax  rates 
on  profit  shares.  The  coefficient  on  tax  rates  is  positive  and  signifi- 
cant  at  the  5  percent  level.  This  result  captures  the  fact  that  both 
series  have  been  declining  over  the  past  45  years  (refer  to  Figure  4). 
This  correlation  is  suspect,  however,  since  the  timing  for  the  declines 
in  profit  shares  and  tax  rates  were  visibly  different. 
As  column  3  in  Table  A3  illustrates,  the  coefficient  on  tax  rates 
changed  signs  and  was  far  from  significant  once  capacity  utilization 
was  added  to  the  model.  This  result  also  is  evident  in  column  4, 
which  includes  the  import  variable.  Profits  were  significantly  higher 
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when  capacity  utilization  was  higher  and  imports  lower.  This  simple 
model  captured  81  percent  of  the  variance  in  profit  shares.  The  lack 
of  significance  for  the  tax  rate  coefficient,  or  even  the  correct  sign, 
provides  little  evidence  that  the  cash  generated  from  tax  reductions 
were  passed  through  to  consumers  or  employees.  The  conclusion  is 
that  tax  reductions  during  this  period  contributed  to  relatively  higher 
after-tax  profits. 
Table  A3 
Estimated  Effects  of  Selected  Variables  on 
Before+lax  Corporate  Profits  as  a  Share  of  GDP 
(1948-1992  annual  observations) 
Independent 
Variable 
Tax  rate 
Estimated  Coefficients 
(standard  errors  in  parentheses) 
Tax  Rates  Full  Model  Full  Model  Full 
Only  Less  Taxes  Less  Imports  Model 
.063*  7021  -.029 
(.028)  (-028)  f.024) 
Capacity  utilization’ 
Imports/GDP 
.125**  .126**  .137** 
(.019)  (.023)  (.022) 
-.247**  -.290** 
(.065)  (.075) 
Constant  .07r  .015  .005  .019 
(.Oll)  (.017)  (.017)  (.017) 
Adjusted  R2  .63  .64  .83  .81 
Durbin-Watson  1.70  1.61  1.64  1.59 
* 
_=  significantly  different  from  zem  at  the  5  percent  level. 
=  si&icantly  cl&rent  from  zem  at  the  1 percent  level. 
‘Coefficient  and  standard  ettot  multiplied  by  100. 
,%urce:  NIPA  and  f+wwmic  fk@rc  tithe  hedent,  1993. 
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Appendix  C 
Company  Data 
A  second  series  of  tests  were  conducted  to  investigate  the  relation- 
ship  between  after-tax  income  and  investment.  The  tests  were 
applied  to  a  sample  of  1,837  firms  drawn  from  the  Compustat 
database  for  the  most  recent  year  of  available  data  (1991).  Since  the 
data  represents  a  cross-section,  the  cost-of-capital  variables  were 
dropped,  but  additional  cash  flow  variables  were  added.  The  depen- 
dent  variable  was  based  on  net  capital  expenditures  for  property, 
plant,  and  equipment.  Cash  flow  was  separated  into  three  compo- 
nents:  depreciation  and  amortization,  income  before  extraordinary 
income  (ordinary  income),  and  extraordinary  income.  Other  vari- 
ables  were  included  to  control  for  other  sources  (and,  when  negative, 
uses)  of  funds.  These  other  variables  included  the  cash  obtained  from 
the  net  sales  of  financial  investments,  the  net  sales  of  the  company’s 
own  stock,  and  the  net  sales  of  the  company’s  debt.  All  of  these  vari- 
ables  were  divided  by  company  net  sales  to  obtain  a  share. 
The  results  of  estimating  this  model  using  ordinary  least  squares  are 
presented  in  the  first  two  columns  of  Table  A4.  It  should  be  noted 
that  the  coefficients  on  three  of  the  additional  variable-net  invest- 
ment,  net  debt,  and  net  stock-were  all  found  to  be  positive,  as 
expected,  and  significant  at  the  1  percent  level.  Also  significant  were 
the  cash  flow  term  and  two  of  its  components,  depreciation  and  ordi- 
nary  income.  Only  extraordinary  income  appears  to  be  unrelated  to 
the  level  of  investment  spending.  The  coefficient  on  ordinary 
income  in  column  2  indicates  that  firms  with  an  additional  $1  of 
income  spend  $0.12  more  on  investment. 
A  second  test  looked  at  the  change  in  investment  spending  among 
the  same  firms  for  the  years  1990  and  1991.  The  numerator  for  each 
variable  was  recalculated  as  the  difference  between  1990  and  1991 
and  divided  by  net  sales  in  the  latter  year.  The  results  of  this  regres- 
sion  are  reported  in  column  3  of  Table  A4.  The  results  for  deprecia- 
tion,  net  investment,  net  debt,  and  net  stock  were  positive  and 
highly  significant.  The  coefficient  on  ordinary  income  reversed  signs 
40  Public Pofiq  Brief Bwiness  Tax  lncentiws  and  lnwsments 
and  continued  to  be  significant.  At  least  for  this  one  year,  firms  that 
experienced  an  increase  in  income  were  more  likely  to  reduce  their 
level  of  investment  spending.  Increases  in  all  other  sources  of  bds 
had  the  expected  effect  of  raising  investment. 
If  only  a  small  fraction  of  higher  income  is  spent  on  real  investment, 
what  happens  to  the  rest?  Other  tests  explored  the  relationship 
between  dividend  payments  and  company  income  (including 
extraordinary  income).  The  results  of  these  regessions  indicate  that 
firms  with  an  additional  $1  of  income  in  1991  distributed  approxi- 
mately  $0.40  of  that  amount  in  dividends.  This  is  comparable  to  the 
estimate  of  $0.56  obtained  from  an  analysis  of  annual  data  for  the 
United  States  for  the  years  1946  to  1992.14 
Additional  tests  were  conducted  to  investigate  the  relationship 
between  income  and  other  sources  of  cash  flow.  It  was  expected  that 
higher  levels  of  income  would  substitute  for  these  other  sources.  This 
is,  in  fact,  what  the  results  in  Table  A5  suggest.  In  columns  1  and  2 
the  estimated  coefficients  on  income  were  minus  .2 11  and  minus 
.165,  which  means  that  firms  with  $1  more  of  income  were  likely  to 
have  $0.16  to  $.21  less  in  cash  from  the  sale  of  stock.  Recall  that  the 
stock  variable  is  equal  to  the  amount  of  cash  raised  ti-om the  sale  of  a 
company’s  own  stock,  less  cash  used  to  buy  back  its  own  stock.  It  is 
possible  that  firms  with  higher  income  either  sold  less  new  stock  or 
bought  more  outstanding  stock.  In  either  case  the  result  means  that 
fewer  funds  were  available  for  investments.  Columns  3  and  4  provide 
estimates  of  the  same  effect  for  net  debt.  It  appears  that  firms  with  $1 
of  additional  income  received  $0.08  to  $0,17  less  from  the  sale  of 
debt.  In  conclusion,  it  appears  that  only  a  small  fixtion  of  additional 
income  is  spent  on  investment.  There  is  some  evidence  that  the  dif- 
ference  is  either  allocated  to  dividends  or  used  in  lieu  of  additional 
equity  or  debt. 
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Table  A4 
Estimated  Effects  of  Selected  Variables  on  Investment  as  a 
Share  of  Sales  from  a  Sample  of  1,837  Firms 
Independent 
Variable 
Estimated  Coefficients 
(standard  errors  in  parentheses) 
Cash  FIow  Cash  Flow  Change  Between 
Aggregate’  Separateda  1990  and  1991 
Cash  flow/sales 
Depreciation/sales 
Ordinary  income/sales 
Extraordinary  income/sales 
1.84** 
(0.14) 
.907**  .847** 
(.025)  (.035) 
.122**  -.058** 
(.Ol  I)  (.015) 
-.017  -.123 
LO741  (.122) 
Cash  flow/sales  (-1)  .006 
(.Oll) 
Net  stock/sales 
Net  debt/sales 
Net  investment/sales 
.166**  .141**  .145** 
(.012)  (.OlO)  (.014) 
.232**  .359**  .175** 
(.020)  C.017)  (.015) 
.232**  .228**  .084** 
(.039)  (.031)  (.040) 
Constant  .052**  .009  -.007 
(.003)  (.003)  (.004) 
Adjusted  R2  .29  .54  .38 
DurbinsWatson  2.04  1.98  1.99 
.*  =  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  5  percent  level. 
=  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1 percent  level. 
‘All  w~l~ws in  1991. 
Sources  Compuxat. 
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Table  AS 
Estimated  Effects  of  the  Relationship 
Between  Income  and  Other  Sources  of  Cash 
from  a  Sample  of  1,837  firms 





Ordinary  income/sales 
(standard  errors  in parentheses) 
Net  Stock/Sales  Net  Debt/Sales 
.034  .OSl  .07a*  .120** 
(.061)  (.060)  LO401  (.035) 
-.211**  -.165**  -.I  73**  -.076** 
t.257)  (.027)  (.017)  (.016) 
Extraordinary  income/sales  .420*  -.223* 
(.178)  (.105) 
- 
Net  stoc!+ales  .004 
t.0141 
-.. 
Net  debt/sales  .OlO 
(.039) 
Net  investment/sales  .389**  .823** 
t.0741  MO) 
- 
Constant  .044**  -  .041**  -.OOG3  -.006 
LOO7)  (.007)  LOO4)  LOO4) 
Adjusted  R2  .039  .058  .066  .248 
Dwbin-Watson  2.01  1.98  1.95  1.95 
* 
_=  significantly  different  from  zcru  at  the  5  percent  level. 
z  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1 percent  level. 
Source:  Compustat. 
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Endnotes 
1.  in  nominal  terms,  the  ratio  of  equipment  investment  to  gross 
domestic  product  is  written  as  (E/Y)  and  in  real  terms  (E’/Y’). 
The  two  ratios  are  related  in  the  following  form: 
where  P  =  price.  It  therefore  should  not  matter  which  ratio  is 
used  as  long  as  the  relative  price,  P,&,  is  also  accounted  for. 
2.  After  1983  the  ITC,  as  reported  by  the  U.S.  Interna  Revenue 
Service,  was  combined  with  other  business  credits.  This  is  one  of 
the  reasons  why  the  series  does  not  fall  to  zero  in  1986. 
3.  The  correlation  coefficient  between  the  two  variables  is  .5  1. 
4.  This  is  equal  to  the  ratio  of  the  price  deflator  for  producer’s 
durable  equipment  divided  by  the  GDP  deflator. 
5.  The  ratio  of  real  equipment  spending  (E’)  to  real  nonresidential 
investment  (N’)  for  1947  to  1992  is  regressed  on  the  investment 
tax  credit  and  the  ratio  of  price  indexes  for  E  and  N.  An  adjust- 
ment  was  made  for  autocorrelation.  The  results  (with  standard 
errors  in  parentheses)  are 
E’/N’  =  1.16  -  .20  ITC  -  .52  PVPN 
R2  =  .93 
(.122)  (.25)  (*II) 
Durbin-Watson  =  1.67 
6.  Profits  (equal  to  total  corporate  profits  with  inventory  and  capi- 
tal  consumption  adjustments  plus  net  interest  paid  by  the  corpos 
rate  sector)  are  divided  by  GDP  to  obtain  a  share.  Average  cor- 
porate  tax  rates  are  equal  to  total  corporate  tax  liabilities  divided 
by  the  same  profit  measure.  Data  are  from  the  National  Income 
and  Product  Accounts  (NIPA). 
7.  In  this  case  dividends  (D)  paid  by  U.S.  corporations  from  1946 
to  1992  were  regressed  on  corporate  after-tax  income  (I). 








Estimates  were  adjusted  for  autocorrelation.  The  results  (with 
standard  errors  in  parentheses)  are 
D  =  -2.53  +  .5641 
(2.87)  (.025) 
Adjusted  R2  =  .97 
Durbin-Watson  =  1.7 
Companies  with  sales  of  less  than  $10  million  or  income  losses 
greater  than  $1  billion  were  excluded.  Companies  for  which 
these  or  other  cash  flow  variables  were  missing  in  either  1990  or 
1991  were  also  excluded. 
The  measure  is  equal  to  the  industrial  production  index  reported 
in  The  Economic  Report  of  the  President,  i993,  divided  by  indus- 
trial  energy  (consumed  in  British  thermal  units),  reported  in  the 
Am&  Energy  Review, U.S.  Department  of  Energy. 
Another  reason  to  repeal  the  ITC,  offered  in  1966  by  Senator 
Albert  Gore,  Sr.  was  its  quality  as  a  special  subsidy  to  capital. 
See  King  (1993),  p.  287. 
At  least  part  of  this  significance  can  be  attributed  to  reverse 
causality,  that  is,  higher  investment  contributes  to  higher  GDP 
growth  and  capacity  utilization. 
See  Chavas  and  Cox  (1992)  for  agriculture  and  Nadiri  and 
Manuneas  (1991)  for  manufacturing. 
The  actual  elasticity,  calculated  at  the  means,  is  .91. 
Dividends  (D)  were  regressed  on  after-tax  company  income  (I) 
for  the  same  sample  of  1,837  firms  in  1991.  The  result  (with 
standard  errors  in  parentheses)  was 
D=  5.49  +  .3951 
(1.65)  (.007) 
Adjusted  R2  =  .61 
Durbin-Watson  =  2.00 
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